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Human Behavior and the Efficiency




Recent literature in empirical finance is surveyed in its relation to
underlying behavioral principles, principles which come primarily from
psychology, sociology and anthropology.  The behavioral principles
discussed are: prospect theory, regret and cognitive dissonance, anchoring,
mental compartments, overconfidence, over- and underreaction, repre-
sentativeness heuristic, the disjunction effect, gambling behavior and
speculation, perceived irrelevance of history, magical thinking, quasi-
magical thinking, attention anomalies, the availability heuristic, culture and
social contagion, and global culture.
Theories of human behavior from psychology, sociology, and anthropology have helped
motivate much recent empirical research on the behavior of financial markets.  In this paper
I will survey both some of the most significant theories (for empirical finance) in these other
social sciences and the empirical finance literature itself.
Particular attention will be paid to the implications of these theories for the efficient
markets hypothesis in finance.  This is the hypothesis that financial prices efficiently
incorporate all public information and that prices can be regarded as optimal estimates of
true investment value at all times.  The efficient markets hypothesis in turn is based on more
primitive notions that people behave rationally, or accurately maximize expected utility, and
are able to process all available information.  The idea behind the term “efficient markets
hypothesis,” a term coined by Harry Roberts (1967),1 has a long history in financial
research, a far longer history than the term itself has.  The hypothesis (without the words
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efficient markets) was given a clear statement in Gibson (1889), and has apparently been
widely known at least since then, if not long before.  All this time there has also been
tension over the hypothesis, a feeling among many that there is something egregiously
wrong with it; for an early example, see MacKay (1841).  In the past couple of decades the
finance literature, has amassed a substantial number of observations of apparent anomalies
(from the standpoint of the efficient markets hypothesis) in financial markets.  These
anomalies suggest that the underlying principles of rational behavior underlying the efficient
markets hypothesis are not entirely correct and that we need to look as well at other models
of human behavior, as have been studied in the other social sciences.
The organization of this paper is different from that of other accounts of the literature
on behavioral finance (for example, De Bondt and Thaler, 1996 or Fama, 1997):  this paper
is organized around a list of theories from the other social sciences that are used by
researchers in finance, rather than around a list of anomalies.  I organized the paper this way
because, in reality, most of the fundamental principles that we want to stress here really do
seem to be imported from the other social sciences.  No surprise here:  researchers in these
other social sciences have done most of the work over the last century on understanding
less-than-perfectly-rational human behavior.  Moreover, each anomaly in finance typically
has more than one possible explanation in terms of these theories from the other social
sciences.  The anomalies are observed in complex real world settings, where many possible
factors are at work, not in the experimental psychologist’s laboratory.  Each of their theories
contributes a little to our understanding of the anomalies, and there is typically no way to
quantify or prove the relevance of any one theory.  It is better to set forth the theories from
the other social sciences themselves, describing when possible the controlled experiments
that demonstrate their validity, and give for each a few illustrations of applications in
finance.
Before beginning, it should be noted that theories of human behavior from these other
social sciences often have underlying motivation that is different from that of economic
theories.  Their theories are often intended to be robust to application in a variety of
everyday, unstructured experiences, while the economic theories are often intended to be
robust in the different sense that, even if the problems the economic agents face become
very clearly defined, their behavior will not change after they learn how to solve the
problems.  Many of the underlying behavioral principles from psychology and other social
sciences that are discussed below are unstable and the hypothesized behavioral phenomena
may disappear when the situation becomes better structured and people have had a lot of
opportunity to learn about it.  Indeed, there are papers in the psychology literature claiming
that many of the cognitive biases in human judgment under uncertainty uncovered by
experimental psychologists will disappear when the experiment is changed so that the
probabilities and issues that the experiment raises are explained clearly enough to subjects
(see, for example, Gigerenzer, 1991).  Experimental subjects can in many cases be con-
vinced, if given proper instruction, that their initial behavior in the experimental situation
was irrational, and they will then correct their ways.
To economists, such evidence is taken to be more damning to the theories than it would
be by the social scientists in these other disciplines.  Apparently economists at large have
not fully appreciated the extent to which enduring patterns can be found in this ‘unstable’
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human behavior.  The examples below of application of theories from other social sciences
to understanding anomalies in financial markets will illustrate.
Each section below, until the conclusion, refers to a theory taken from the literature in
psychology, sociology or anthropology.  The only order of these sections is that I have
placed first theories that seem to have the more concrete applications in finance, leaving
some more impressionistic applications to the end.  In the conclusion I attempt to put these
theories into perspective, and to recall that there are also important strengths in conventional
economic theory and in the efficient markets hypothesis itself.  
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) has probably
had more impact than any other behavioral theory on economic research.  Prospect theory
is very influential despite the fact that it is still viewed by much of the economics profession
at large as of far less importance than expected utility theory.  Among economists, prospect
theory has a distinct, though still prominent, second place to expected utility theory for most
research.
I should say something first about the expected utility theory that still retains the
position of highest honor in the pantheon of economic tools.  It has dominated much
economic theory so long because the theory offers a parsimonious representation of truly
rational behavior under uncertainty.  The axioms (Savage, 1954) from which expected utility
theory is derived are undeniably sensible representations of basic requirements of ration-
ality.  For many purposes, it serves well to base an economic theory on such assumptions
of strictly rational behavior, especially if the assumptions of the model are based on simple,
robust realities, if the model concerns well-considered decisions of informed people, and if
the phenomenon to be explained is one of stable behavior over many repetitions, where
learning about subtle issues has a good chance of occurring.
Still, despite the obvious attractiveness of expected utility theory, it has long been
known that the theory has systematically mispredicted human behavior, at least in certain
circumstances.  Allais (1953) reported examples showing that in choosing between certain
lotteries, people systematically violate the theory.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) give the
following experimental evidence to illustrate one of Allais’ examples.  When their subjects
were asked to choose between a lottery offering a 25% chance of winning 3,000 and a
lottery offering a 20% chance of winning 4,000, 65% of their subjects chose the latter, while
when subjects were asked to choose between a 100% chance of winning 3,000 and an 80%
chance of winning 4,000, 80% chose the former.  Expected utility theory predicts that they
should not choose differently in these two cases, since the second choice is the same as the
first except that all probabilities are multiplied by the same constant.  Their preference for
the first choice in the lottery when it is certain in this example illustrates what is called the
“certainty effect,” a preference for certain outcomes.
Prospect theory is a mathematically-formulated alternative to the theory of expected
utility maximization, an alternative that is supposed to capture the results of such
experimental research.  (A prospect is the Kahneman–Tversky name for a lottery as in the
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Allais example above.)  Prospect theory actually resembles expected utility theory in that
individuals are represented as maximizing a weighted sum of “utilities,” although the
weights are not the same as probabilities and the “utilities” are determined by what they call
a “value function” rather than a utility function.
The weights are, according to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) determined by a function
of true probabilities which gives zero weight to extremely low probabilities and a weight of
one to extremely high probabilities.  That is, people behave as if they regard extremely
improbable events as impossible and extremely probable events as certain.  However, events
that are just very improbable (not extremely improbable) are given too much weight; people
behave as if they exaggerate the probability.  Events that are very probable (not extremely
probable) are given too little weight; people behave as if they underestimate the probability.
What constitutes an extremely low (rather than very low) probability or an extremely high
(rather than very high) probability is determined by individuals’ subjective impression and
prospect theory is not precise about this.  Between the very low and very high probabilities,
the weighting function (weights as a function of true probabilities) has a slope of less than
one.
This shape for the weighting function allows prospect theory to explain the Allais
certainty effect noted just above.  Since the 20% and 25% probabilities are in the range of
the weighting function where its slope is less than one, the weights people attach to the two
outcomes are more nearly equal than are the probabilities, and people tend just to choose the
lottery that pays more if it wins.  In contrast, in the second lottery choice the 80%
probability is reduced by the weighting function while the 100% probability is not; the
weights people attach to the two outcomes are more unequal than are the probabilities, and
people tend just to choose the outcome that is certain.
If we modify expected utility function only by substituting the Kahneman and Tversky
weights for the probabilities in expected utility theory, we might help explain a number of
puzzling phenomena in observed human behavior toward risk.  For a familiar example, such
a modification could explain the apparent public enthusiasm for high-prize lotteries, even
though the probability of winning is so low that expected payout of the lottery is not high.
It could also explain such phenomenon as the observed tendency for overpaying for airline
flight insurance (life insurance policies that one purchases before an airline flight, that has
coverage only during that flight), Eisner and Strotz (1961).
The Kahneman–Tversky weighting function may explain observed overpricing of out-
of-the-money and in-the-money options.  Much empirical work on stock options pricing has
uncovered a phenomenon called the “options smile” (see Mayhew, 1995, for a review.).
This means that both deep out-of-the-money and deep in-the-money options have relatively
high prices, when compared with their theoretical prices using Black–Scholes formulae,
while near-the-money options are more nearly correctly priced.  Options theorists,
accustomed to describing the implied volatility of the stock implicit in options prices, like
to state this phenomenon not in terms of option prices but in terms of these implied
volatilities.  When the implied volatility for options of various strike prices at a point in time
derived using the Black–Scholes (1973) formula are plotted, on the vertical axis, against the
strike price on the horizontal axis, the curve often resembles a smile.  The curve is higher
both for low strike price (out-of-the-money) options and for high strike price (in-the-money)
2There are other potential explanations of the options smile in terms of nonnormality or jump
processes for returns, and these have received the attention in the options literature. Such explanations
might even provide a complete rational basis for the smile, though it is hard to know for sure.  Since
the 1987 stock market crash, the options smile has usually appeared distorted into an options “leer,”
with the left side of the mouth higher (e.g., the deep out-of-the-money puts are especially overpriced),
see Bates (1995), Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1995) and Bates (1991). Public memories of the 1987
crash are apparently at work in producing this “leer.”
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options than it is for middle-range strike prices.  This options smile might possibly be
explained in terms of the distortion in probabilities represented by the Kahneman–Tversky
weighting function, since the theory would suggest that people act as if they overestimate
the small probability that the price of the underlying crosses the strike price and
underestimate the high probability that the price remains on the same side of the strike price.
The Kahneman–Tversky weighting function might even explain the down-turned corners
of the mouth that some smiles exhibit (see Fortune, 1996) if at these extremes the
discontinuities at the extremes of the weighting function become relevant.2
  We now turn to the other foundation of prospect theory, the Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) value function.  The value function differs from the utility function in expected
utility theory in a very critical respect:  the function (of wealth or payout) has a kink in it at
a point, the “reference point,” the location of which is determined by the subjective
impressions of the individual.  The reference point is the individual’s point of comparison,
the “status quo” against which alternative scenarios are contrasted.  Taking value as a
function of wealth, the Kahneman–Tversky (1979) value function is upward sloping
everywhere, but with an abrupt decline in slope at the reference point (today’s wealth or
whatever measure of wealth that is psychologically important to the subject).  For wealth
levels above the reference point, the value function is concave downward, just as are
conventional utility functions.  At the reference point, the value function may be regarded,
from the fact that its slope changes abruptly there, as infinitely concave downward.  For
wealth levels below the reference point, Kahneman and Tversky found evidence that the
value function is concave upward, not downward.  People are risk lovers for losses, they
asserted.
Perhaps the most significant thing to notice about the Kahneman–Tversky value
function is just the discontinuity in slope at the reference value, the abrupt downward
change in slope as one moves upward past the reference value.  Prospect theory does not nail
down accurately what determines the location of the reference point, just as it does not nail
down accurately, for the weighting function, what is the difference between very high
probabilities and extremely high probabilities.  The theory does not specify these matters
because experimental evidence has not produced any systematic patterns of behavior that
can be codified in a general theory.  However, the reference point is thought to be
determined by some point of comparison that the subject finds convenient, something
readily visible or suggested by the wording of a question.
This discontinuity means that, in making choices between risky outcomes, people will
behave in a risk averse manner, no matter how small the amounts at stake are.  This is a
contrast to the prediction of expected utility theory with a utility function of wealth without
3Mehra and Prescott did not discover the equity premium. Perhaps that honor should go to Smith
(1925), although there must be even earlier antecedents in some forms.  Mehra and Prescott’s original
contribution seems to have been, in the context of present-value investor intertemporal optimizing
models, to stress that the amount of risk aversion that would justify the equity premium, given the
observed correlation of stocks with consumption, would imply much higher riskless interest rates than
we in fact see.
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kinks, for which, since the utility function is approximately linear for small wealth changes,
people should behave as if they are risk neutral for small bets.  That people would usually
be risk neutral for small bets would be the prediction of expected utility theory even if the
utility function has such a slope discontinuity, since the probability that wealth is currently
at the kink is generally zero.  With prospect theory, in contrast, the kink always moves with
wealth to stay at the perceived current level of wealth (or the current point of reference); the
kink is always relevant.
Samuelson (1963) told a story which he perceived as demonstrating a violation of
expected utility theory, and, although it came before Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect
theory, it illustrates the importance of the kink in the value function.  Samuelson reported
that he asked a lunch colleague whether he would accept a bet that paid him $200 with a
probability of .5 and lost him $100 with a probability of .5.  The colleague said he would not
take the bet, but that he would take a hundred of them.  With 100 such bets, his expected
total winnings are $5,000 and he has virtually no chance of losing any money.  It seems
intuitively compelling to many people that one would readily take the complete set of bets,
even if any element of the set is unattractive.  Samuelson proved that if his colleague would
answer the same way at any wealth level, then he necessarily violates expected utility
theory.
Samuelson’s colleague is not, however, in violation of prospect theory.  When viewing
a single bet, the kink in the value function is the dominant consideration.  If he were to judge
100 bets sequentially, the kink would always be relevant (the reference point would move
with each successive bet) and he would reject all of them.  But if he were to judge 100 bets
together, the collective outcomes would be far above today’s value function kink, and the
bet is, by prospect theory, clearly desirable.
The failures to accept many such bets when one considers them individually has been
called “myopic loss aversion” by Benartzi and Thaler (1995).  They argue that, under
estimated values for the magnitude of the kink in the Kahneman–Tversky value function,
the “equity premium puzzle” of Mehra and Prescott (1985) can be resolved; see also Siegel
and Thaler (1997).
 Today, the term “equity premium puzzle,” coined by Mehra and Prescott (1985), is
widely used to refer to the puzzlingly high historical average returns of stocks relative to
bonds.3  The equity premium is the difference between the historical average return in the
stock market and the historical average return on investments in bonds or treasury bills.
According to Siegel (1994), the equity premium of U.S. stocks over short-term government
bonds has averaged 6.1% a year for the United States for 1926 to 1992, and so one naturally
4Siegel (1994, p. 20). However, Siegel notes that the U.S. equity premium was only 1.9% per year
1816–70 and 2.8% per year 1871–1925.
5Siegel (1994, p. 31).  It should be noted that one must push the investor horizon up to a fairly
high number, around 30 years, before one finds that historically stocks have always outperformed
bonds since 1871; for ten year periods of time one finds that bonds often outperform stocks.  There
are not many thirty-year periods in stock market history, so this information might be judged as
insubstantial.  Moreover, Siegel notes that even with a thirty-year period stocks did not always
outperform bonds in the U.S. before 1871.
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wonders why people invest at all in debt if it is so outperformed by stocks.4  Those who have
tried to reconcile the equity premium with rational investor behavior commonly point out
the higher risk that short-run stock market returns show:  investors presumably are not fully
enticed by the higher average returns of stocks since stocks carry higher risk.  But, such
riskiness of stocks is not a justification of the equity premium, at least assuming that
investors are mostly long term.  Most investors ought to be investing over decades, since
most of us expect to live for many decades, and to spend the twilight of their lives living off
savings.  Over long periods of times, it has actually been long-term bonds (whose payout is
fixed in nominal terms), not the stocks, that have been more risky in real terms, since the
consumer price index has been, despite its low variability from month to month, very
variable over long intervals of time, see Siegel (1994).  Moreover, stocks appear strictly to
dominate bonds: there is no thirty-year period since 1871 in which a broad portfolio of
stocks was outperformed either by bonds or treasury bills.5
Benartzi and Thaler show (1995) that if people use a one-year horizon to evaluate
investments in the stock market, then the high equity premium is explained by myopic loss
aversion.  Moreover, prospect theory does not suggest that in this case riskless real interest
rates need be particularly high.  Thus, if we accept prospect theory and that people frame
stock market returns as short-term, the equity premium puzzle is solved.
Benartzi and Thaler (1996) demonstrated experimentally that when subjects are asked
to allocate their defined contribution pension plans between stocks and fixed incomes, their
responses differed sharply depending on how historical returns were presented to them.  If
they were shown 30 one-year returns, their median allocation to stocks was 40%, but if they
were shown 30-year returns their median allocation to stocks was 90%.  Thaler, Tversky,
Kahneman and Schwartz (1997) shows further experiments confirming this response.
Loss aversion has also been used to explain other macroeconomic phenomena, savings
behavior (Bowman, Minehart and Rabin, 1993) and job search behavior (Bryant, 1990).
Regret and Cognitive Dissonance
There is a human tendency to feel the pain of regret at having made errors, even small
errors, not putting such errors into a larger perspective.  One “kicks one elf” at having done
something foolish.  If one wishes to avoid the pain of regret, one may alter one’s behavior
in ways that would in some cases be irrational unless account is taken of the pain of regret.
The pain of regret at having made errors is in some senses embodied in the Kahneman–
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Tversky notion of a kink in the value function at the reference point.  There are also other
ways of representing how people behave who feel pain of regret.  Loomes and Sugden
(1982) have suggested that people maximize the expected value of a “modified utility
function” which is a function of the utility they achieve from a choice as well as the utility
they would have achieved from another choice that was considered.  Bell (1982) proposed
a similar analysis.
Regret theory may apparently help explain the fact that investors defer selling stocks
that have gone down in value and accelerate the selling of stocks that have gone up in value,
Shefrin and Statman (1985).  Regret theory may be interpreted as implying that investors
avoid selling stocks that have gone down in order not to finalize the error they make and not
to feel the regret.  They sell stocks that have gone up in order that they cannot regret failing
to do so before the stock later fell, should it do so.  That such behavior exists has been
documented using volume of trade data by Ferris, Haugen and Makhija (1988) and Odean
(1996b).
Cognitive dissonance is the mental conflict that people experience when they are
presented with evidence that their beliefs or assumptions are wrong; as such, cognitive
dissonance might be classified as a sort of pain of regret, regret over mistaken beliefs.  As
with regret theory, the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) asserts that there is
a tendency for people to take actions to reduce cognitive dissonance that would not normally
be considered fully rational:   the person may avoid the new information or develop
contorted arguments to maintain the beliefs or assumptions.  There is empirical support that
people often make the errors represented by the theory of cognitive dissonance.  For
example, in a classic study, Erlich, Guttman, Schopenback and Mills (1957) showed that
new car purchasers selectively avoid reading, after the purchase is completed, adver-
tisements for car models that they did not choose, and are attracted to advertisements for the
car they chose.
McFadden (1974) modelled the effect of cognitive dissonance in terms of a probability
of forgetting contrary evidence and showed how this probability will ultimately distort
subjective probabilities.  Goetzmann and Peles (1993) have argued that the same theory of
cognitive dissonance could explain the observed phenomenon that money flows in more
rapidly to mutual funds that have performed extremely well than flows out from mutual
funds that have performed extremely poorly:  investors in losing funds are unwilling to
confront the evidence that they made a bad investment by selling their investments.  
Anchoring
It is well-known that when people are asked to make quantitative assessments their
assessments are influenced by suggestions.  An example of this is found in the results survey
researchers obtain.  These researchers often ask people about their incomes using
questionnaires in which respondents are instructed to indicate which of a number of income
brackets, shown as choices on the questionnaire, their incomes fall into.  It has been shown
that the answers people give are influenced by the brackets shown on the questionnaire.  The
tendency to be influenced by such suggestions is called “anchoring” by psychologists.
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In some cases, at least, anchoring may be rational behavior for respondents.  They may
rationally assume that the deviser of the questionnaire uses some information (in this case,
about typical people’s incomes) when devising the questionnaire.  Not fully remembering
their own income, they may rely on the information in the brackets to help them answer
better.  If the brackets do contain information, then it is rational for subjects to allow
themselves to be influenced by the brackets.
While anchoring undoubtedly has an information-response component in many
circumstances, it has also been shown that anchoring behavior persists even when
information is absent.  In one experiment Tversky and Kahneman (1974), subjects were
given simple questions whose answers were in percentages, e.g., the percentage of African
nations in the United Nations.  A wheel of fortune with numbers from 1 to 100 was spun
before the subjects.  Obviously, the number at which the wheel of fortune stopped had no
relevance to the question just asked.  Subjects were asked whether their answer was higher
or lower than the wheel of fortune number, and then to give their own answer.
Respondents’ answers were strongly influenced by the “wheel of fortune.”  For example,
the median estimates of the percentage of African countries in the United Nations were 25
and 45 for groups that received 10 and 65, respectively, as starting points (p. 184).
Values in speculative markets, like the stock market, are inherently ambiguous.  Who
would know what the value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average should be?  Is it really
“worth” 6,000 today?  Or 5,000 or 7,000? or 2,000 or 10,000?  There is no agreed-upon
economic theory that would answer these questions.  In the absence of any better
information, past prices (or asking prices or prices of similar objects or other simple
comparisons) are likely to be important determinants of prices today.
That anchoring affects valuations, even by experts, was demonstrated by Northcraft and
Neale (1987) in the context of real estate valuation.  All subjects were taken to a house for
sale, asked to inspect the house for up to 20 minutes, and were given a ten-page packet of
information about the house and about other houses in the area, giving square footage and
characteristics of the properties, and prices of the other properties.  The same packet was
given to all subjects except that the asking price of the property under consideration and its
implied price per square foot were changed between subjects.  Subjects were asked for their
own opinions of its appraisal value, appropriate listing price, purchase price, and the lowest
offer the subject would accept for the house if the subject were the seller.  The real estate
agents who were given an asking price of $119,900 had a mean predicted appraisal value
of $114,204, listing price of $117,745, purchase price of $111,454 and a lowest acceptable
offer of $111,136, while the real estate agents who were given an asking price of $149,900
had a mean appraisal value of $128,754, listing price of $130,981, predicted purchase price
of $127,318, and a lowest offer of $123,818.  The changed asking prices thus swayed their
valuations by 11% to 14% of the value of the house.  Similar results were found with
amateur subjects.  While this experiment does not rule out that the effect of the asking price
was due to a rational response to the assumed information in the asking price, the effects of
asking price are remarkably large, given that so much other information on the house was
also given.  Moreover, when subjects were asked afterwards to list the items of information
that weighed most heavily in their valuations, only 8% of the expert subjects and only 9%
of the amateur subjects listed asking price of the property under consideration among the
6The notion that speculative prices approximately describe "random walks" was first proposed
by Bachelier (1900, 1964).  It became widely associated with the efficient markets hypothesis, the
hypothesis that market prices efficiently incorporate all available information, with the work of Fama
(1970).  For further information on the literature on the random walk and efficient markets theory see
also Cootner (1964), Malkiel (1981), and Fama (1991).
7For a discussion of the anomaly, see Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1995) and Froot and Thaler
(1990).
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top three items.  Note that the valuation problem presented to these subjects is far less
difficult or ambiguous than the problem of determining the “correct” value for the stock
market, since here they are implicitly being asked to assume that the comparable properties
are correctly valued.  (See also McFadden, 1974 and Silberman and Klock, 1989.)
One might object that the notion that anchoring on past prices helps determine present
price in the stock market might be inconsistent with the low serial correlation of stock price
changes, that is with the roughly random-walk behavior of daily or monthly stock prices that
has been widely noted.6  This conclusion is not warranted however.  Models of “smart
money” (i.e., people who are unusually alert to profit opportunities in financial markets)
seeking to exploit serial correlation in price, models which also include ordinary investors,
are consistent with the implications that serial correlation is low and yet the anchoring
remains important for the level of stock prices (see Shiller, 1984, 1990).
By extension from these experimental results, it is to be presumed that very many
economic phenomena are influenced by anchoring.  Gruen and Gizycki (1993) used it to
explain the widely observed anomaly7 that forward discounts to not properly explain
subsequent exchange rate movements.  The anchoring phenomenon would appear relevant
to the “sticky prices” that are so talked about by macroeconomists.  So long as past prices
are taken as suggestions of new prices, the new prices will tend to be close to the past prices.
The more ambiguous the value of a commodity, the more important a suggestion is likely
to be, and the more important anchoring is likely to be for price determination.
The anchoring phenomenon may help to explain certain international puzzles observed
in financial markets.  U.S. investors who thought in the late 1980s that Japanese stock price–
earnings ratios were outrageously high then may have been influenced by the readily-
available anchor of (much lower) U.S. price–earnings ratios.  By the mid 1990s, many U.S.
investors feel that the Tokyo market is no longer overpriced (see Shiller, Kon-Ya and
Tsutsui, 1996), even though price–earnings ratios remain much higher than in the U.S.
perhaps because the anchor of the widely-publicized high Tokyo price–earnings ratios of the
late 1980s appears to be another anchor.
Anchoring may also be behind certain forms of money illusion.  The term money
illusion, introduced by Fisher (1928), refers to a human tendency to make inadequate
allowance, in economic decisions, for the rate of inflation, and to confuse real and nominal
quantities.  Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) have shown experimentally that people
tend to give different answers to the same hypothetical decision problem depending on
whether the problem was presented in a way that stressed nominal quantities or in a way that
8There appears to be much more to money illusion than just anchoring; people associate nominal
quantities with opinions about the economy, anticipated behavior of the government, fairness, and
prestige, opinions that are not generally shared by economists, see Shiller (1997a,b).
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stressed real quantities.  The quantities that were shown in the question (whether nominal
or real) may have functioned as anchors.8
Mental Compartments
Related to the anchoring and framing phenomena is a human tendency to place particular
events into mental compartments based on superficial attributes.  Instead of looking at the
big picture, as would be implied by expected utility theory, they look at individual small
decisions separately.
People may tend to place their investments into arbitrarily separate mental com-
partments, and react separately to the investments based on which compartment they are in.
Shefrin and Statman (1994) have argued that individual investors think naturally in terms
of having a “safe” part of their portfolio that is protected from downside risk and a risky part
that is designed for a chance of getting rich.  Shefrin and Thaler (1988) have argued that
people put their sources of income into three categories, current wage and salary income,
asset income, and future income, and spend differently out of the present values of these
different incomes.  For example, people are reluctant to spend out of future income even if
it is certain to arrive.  
The tendency for people to allow themselves to be influenced by their own mental
compartments might explain the observed tendency for stock prices to jump up when the
stock is added to the Standard and Poor Stock Index (see Shleifer, 1986). It might also help
explain the widely noted “January effect” anomaly.  This anomaly, that stock prices tend to
go up in January, has been observed in as many as 15 different countries (Gultekin and
Gultekin, 1983).  The anomaly cannot be explained in terms of effects related to the tax
year, since it persists also in Great Britain (whose tax year begins in April) and Australia
(whose tax year begins in July), see Thaler (1987).  If people view the year end as a time of
reckoning and a new year as a new beginning, they may be inclined them to behave
differently at the turn of the year, and this may explain the January effect.
A tendency to separate out decisions into separate mental compartments may also be
behind the observed tendency for hedgers to tend to hedge specific trades, rather than their
overall profit situation.  René Stulz (1996, p. 8), in summarizing the results of his research
and that of others on the practice of risk management by firms, concludes that:
It immediately follows from the modern theory of risk management that one
should be concerned about factors that affect the present value of future
cash flows.  This is quite different from much of the current practice of risk
management where one is concerned about hedging transaction risk or the
risk of transactions expected to occur in the short run.
9Recent surveys of hedging behavior of firms indicates that despite extensive development of
derivative products, actual use of these products for hedging is far from optimal.  Of the firms cited
in the Wharton/study, only 40.5% reported using derivatives at all. On the other hand, Dolde (1993)
surveyed 244 Fortune 500 companies and concluded that over 85% used swaps, forwards, futures or
options in managing financial risk. Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) in a survey of 194 firms
reported that 62% used hedging instruments in 1986. These studies concentrated on rather larger
companies than did the Wharton study.  Overall, these studies may be interpreted as revealing a
surprisingly low fraction of respondents who do any hedging, given that firms are composed of many
people, any one of whom might be expected to initiate the use of derivatives.
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The Wharton/CIBC Wood Gundy 1995 Survey of Derivatives Usage by U.S. Non-
Financial Firms (Bodnar and Marston, 1996) studied 350 firms:  176 firms in the
manufacturing sector, 77 firms in the primary products sector, and 97 firms in the service
sector.  When asked by the Wharton surveyors what was the most important objective of
hedging strategy, 49% answered managing “volatility in cashflows,” 42% answered
managing “volatility in accounting earnings,” and only 8% answered managing “the market
value of the firm” (1% answered “managing balance sheet accounts and ratios”).  Fifty
percent of the respondents in the survey reported frequently hedging contractual
commitments, but only 8% reported frequently hedging competitive/economic exposure.
It is striking that only 8% reported that their most important objective is the market
value of the firm, since maximizing the market value of the firm is, by much financial
theory, the ultimate objective of the management of the firm.  It is of course hard to know
just what people meant by their choices of answers, but there is indeed evidence that firms
are driven in their hedging by the objective of hedging specific near-term transactions, and
neglect consideration of future transactions or other potential factors that might also pose
longer run risks to the firm.  In the Wharton study, among respondents hedging foreign
currency risks, 50% reported hedging anticipated transactions less than one year off, but
only 11% report frequently hedging transactions more than one year off.  This discrepancy
is striking, since most of the value of the firm (and most of the concerns it has about its
market value) must come in future years, not the present year.9
Overconfidence, Over- and Under-Reaction and
the Representativeness Heuristic
People often tend to show, in experimental settings, excessive confidence about their own
judgments.  Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Philips (1977) asked subjects to answer simple
factual questions (e.g., “Is Quito the capital of Ecuador?”) and then asked them to give the
probability that their answer was right:  subjects tended to overestimate the probability that
they were right, in response to a wide variety of questions.
Such studies have been criticized (see Gigerenzer, 1991) as merely reflecting nothing
more than a difference between subjective and frequentist definitions of probability, i.e.,
critics claimed that individuals were simply reporting a subjective degree of certainty, not
the fraction times they are right in such circumstances.  However, in reaction to such
criticism, Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977) repeated the experiments asking the
10People tend to neglect “base rates,” the unconditional probabilities or frequencies of events, see
Meehl and Rosen (1955).
11Rabin (1996) characterizes this judgment error as a tendency to over-infer the probability
distribution from short sequences.  Part of overconfidence may be nothing more than simple forgetting
of contrary evidence; a tendency to forget is by its very nature not something that one can learn to
prevent.
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subjects for probability odds that they are right and very clearly explaining what such odds
mean, and even asking them to stake money on their answer.  The overconfidence
phenomenon persisted.  Moreover, in cases where the subjects said they were certain they
were right, they were in fact right only about 80% of the time:  there is no interpretation of
subjective probability that could reconcile this  result with correct judgments.
A tendency towards overconfidence among ordinary investors seems apparent when one
interviews them.  One quickly hears what seem to be overconfident statements.  But how can
it be that people systematically are so overconfident?  Why wouldn’t people learn from
life’s experiences to correct their overconfidence?
Obviously, people do learn substantially in circumstances when the consequences of
their errors are repeatedly presented to them, and sometimes they even overreact and show
too little confidence.  But still there seems to be a common bias towards overconfidence.
Overconfidence is apparently related to some deep-set psychological phenomena:  Ross
(1987) argues that much overconfidence is related to a broader difficulty  with “situational
construal,” a difficulty in making adequate allowance for the uncertainty in one’s own view
of the broad situation, a more global difficulty tied up with multiple mental processes.
Overconfidence may also be traced to the “representativeness heuristic,” Tversky and
Kahneman (1974), a tendency for people to try to categorize events as typical or repre-
sentative of a well-known class, and then, in making probability estimates, to overstress the
importance of such a categorization, disregarding evidence about the underlying
probabilities.10  One consequence of this heuristic is a tendency for people to see patterns
in data that is truly random, to feel confident, for example, that a series which is in fact a
random walk is not a random walk.11
Overconfidence itself does not imply that people overreact (or underreact) to all news.
In fact, evidence on the extent of overreaction or underreaction of speculative asset prices
to news has been mixed.
There has indeed been evidence of overreaction.  The first substantial statistical
evidence for what might be called a general market overreaction can be found in the
literature on excess volatility of speculative asset prices, Shiller (1979, 1981a,b) and LeRoy
and Porter (1981).  We showed statistical evidence that speculative asset prices show
persistent deviations from the long-term trend implied by the present-value efficient markets
model, and then, over horizons of many years, to return to this trend.  This pattern of price
behavior, it was argued, made aggregate stock prices much more volatile than would be
implied by the efficient markets model.  It appears as if stock prices overreact to some news,
or to their own past values, before investors come to their senses and correct the prices.  Our
arguments led to a spirited debate about the validity of the efficient markets model in the
12There has been some confusion about the sense in which the present-value efficient markets
model puts restrictions on the short-run (or high frequency) movements in speculative asset prices.
The issues are laid out in Shiller (1979), (appendix).  Kleidon (1986) rediscovered the same ideas
again, but gave a markedly different interpretation of the implications for tests of market efficiency.
13An extensive summary of the literature on serial correlation of US stock index returns is in
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997).  Chapter 2 documents the positive serial correlation of returns
over short horizons, but concludes that the evidence for negative serial correlation of returns over long
horizons is weak.  Chapter 7, however, shows evidence that long-horizon returns are negatively
correlated with the price-earnings ratio and price-dividend ratio.  Recent critics of claims that long-
horizon returns can be forecasted include Goetzmann and Jorion (1992), Nelson and Kim (1993) and
Kirby (1997).  In my view, they succeed in reducing the force of the evidence, but not the conclusion
that long-horizon returns are quite probably forecastable.
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finance literature, a literature that has too many facets to summarize here, except to say that
it confirms there are many potential interpretations of any statistical results based on limited
data.12 My own view of the outcome of this debate is that it is quite likely that speculative
asset prices tend to be excessively volatile.  Certainly, at the very least, one can say that no
one has been able to put forth any evidence that there is not excess volatility in speculative
asset prices.  For an evaluation of this literature, see Shiller (1989), Campbell and Shiller
(1988, 1989), West (1988), and Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, Ch. 7).
Since then, papers by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Fama and French (1988), Poterba
and Summers (1988), and Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991) have confirmed the excess
volatility claims by showing that returns tend to be negatively autocorrelated over horizons
of three to five years, that an initial overreaction is gradually corrected.  Moreover,
Campbell and Shiller (1988, 1989) show that aggregate stock market dividend yields or
earnings yields are positively correlated with subsequently observed returns over similar
intervals; see also Dreman and Berry (1995).13  Campbell and Shiller (1998) connect this
predictive power to the observed stationarity of these ratios.  Since the ratios have no
substantial trend over a century and appear mean reverting over much shorter time intervals,
the ratio must predict future changes in either the numerator (the dividend or earnings) or
the denominator (the price); we showed that it has been unequivocally the denominator, the
price, that has restored the ratios to their mean after they depart from it, and not the
numerator.  La Porta (1996) found that stocks for which analysts projected low earnings
growth tended to show upward price jumps on earnings announcement dates, and stocks for
which analysts projected high earnings growth tended to show downward price jumps on
earnings announcement dates.  He interprets this as consistent with a hypothesis that
analysts (and the market) excessively extrapolated past earnings movements and only
gradually correct their errors as earnings news comes in.  The behavior of initial public
offerings around announcement dates appears also to indicate some overreaction and later
rebound, see Ibbotson and Ritter (1988) and Ritter (1991).
On the other hand, there has also been evidence of what might be called underreaction.
Most days when big news breaks have been days of only modest stock market price
movements, the big movements tending to come on days when there is little news, see
Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989).  Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991) also found that
14Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Lehmann (1990), however, find evidence of negative serial
correlation of individual weekly stock returns between successive weeks.  As explained by Lo and
MacKinlay (1990), weekly returns on portfolios of these same stocks still exhibit positive serial
correlation from week to week because the cross-covariances between returns of individual stocks are
positive.  They conclude that this pattern of cross-covariances is not what one would expect to find
based on theories of investor inertia.  Lehmann, however, has a different interpretation of the negative
week-to-week serial correlation of individual weekly stock returns, that the negative serial correlation
reflects nothing more than the behavior of market makers facing order imbalances and asymmetric
information.
15Firms’ management appear acutely aware that earnings growth has a psychological impact on
prices, and so attempt to manage earnings accounting to provide a steady growth path.  Impressive
evidence that they do so is found in Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1997).
16Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argue that public failure to understand the relation of interest rates
to inflation has caused the stock market to overreact to nominal interest rate changes.
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for a number of indices of returns on major categories of speculative assets there has been
a tendency for positive autocorrelation of short-run returns over short horizons, less than a
year; see also Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996).14
This positive serial correlation in return indices has been interpreted as implying an initial
underreaction of prices to news, to be made up gradually later.  Bernard and Thomas (1992)
found evidence of underreaction of stock prices to changes, from the previous year, in
company earnings:  prices react with a lag to earnings news; see also Ball and Brown
(1968).15  Irving Fisher (1930, Ch. XXI, pp. 493–94) thought that, because of human error,
nominal interest rates tend to underreact to inflation, so that there is a tendency for low real
interest rates in periods of high inflation, and high real rates in periods of low inflation.
More recent data appear to confirm this behavior of real interest rates, and data on
inflationary expectations also bear out Fisher’s interpretation that the phenomenon has to
do with human error; see De Bondt and Bange (1992) and Shefrin (1997).16
Does the fact that securities prices sometimes underreact pose any problems for the
psychological theory that people tend to be overconfident?  Some observers seem to think
that it does.  In fact, however, overconfidence and overreaction are quite different
phenomena.  People simply cannot overreact to everything: if they are overconfident they
will make errors, but not in any specified direction in all circumstances.  The concepts of
overreaction or underreaction, while they may be useful in certain contexts, are not likely
to be good psychological foundations on which to organize a general theory of economic
behavior.
The fact that both overreaction and underreaction are observed in financial markets has
been interpreted by Fama (1997) as evidence that the anomalies from the standpoint of
efficient markets theory are just “chance results,” and that therefore the theory of market
efficiency survives the challenge of its critics.  He is right, of course, that both overreaction
and underreaction together may sometimes seem a little puzzling.  But one is not likely to
want to dismiss these as “chance results” if one has an appreciation for the psychological
theory that might well bear on these phenomena.  In his survey of behavioral finance Fama
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(1997) makes no more than a couple of oblique references to any literature from the other
social sciences.  In fact, Fama states that the literature on testing market efficiency has no
clearly stated alternative, “the alternative hypothesis is vague, market inefficiency” (p. 1).
Of course, if one has little appreciation of these alternative theories then one might well
conclude that the efficient markets theory, for all its weaknesses, is the best theory we have.
Fama appears to believe that the principal alternative theory is just one of consistent
overreaction or underreaction, and says that “since the anomalies literature has not settled
on a testable alternative to market efficiency, to get the ball rolling, I assume that reasonable
alternatives must predict either over-reaction or under-reaction” (p. 2).  The psychological
theories reviewed here cannot be reduced to such simple terms, contrary to Fama’s
expectations.
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a psychological model, involving the
representativeness heuristic as well as a principle of conservatism (Edwards, 1968), that
offers a reconciliation of the overreaction and underreaction evidence from financial
markets; see also Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1997) and Wang (1997).  More
work could be done in understanding when it is that people overreact in financial markets
and when it is that they underreact.  Understanding these overreaction and underreaction
phenomena together appears to be a fertile field for research at the present time.  There is
neither reason to think that it is easy obtain such an understanding, nor reason to despair that
it can ever be done.
Overconfidence may have more clear implications for the volume of trade in financial
markets than for any tendency to overreact.  If we connect the phenomenon of
overconfidence with the phenomenon of anchoring, we see the origins of differences of
opinion among investors, and some of the source of the high volume of trade among
investors.  People may fail to appreciate the extent to which their own opinions are affected
by anchoring to cues that randomly influenced them, and take action when there is little
reason to do so.
The extent of the volume of trade in financial markets has long appeared to be a puzzle.
The annual turnover rate (shares sold divided by all shares outstanding) for New York Stock
Exchange Stocks has averaged 18% a year from the 1950s through the 1970s, and has been
much higher in certain years.  The turnover rate was 73% in 1987 and 67% in 1930.  It does
not appear to be possible to justify the number of trades in stocks and other speculative
assets in terms of the normal life-cycle ins and outs of the market.  Theorists have
established a “nonspeculation theorem” that states that rational agents who differ from each
other only in terms of information and who have no reason to trade in the absence of
information will not trade (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982l; Geanakoplos, 1992).
Apparently, many investors do feel that they do have speculative reasons to trade often,
and apparently this must have to do with some tendency for each individual to have beliefs
that he or she perceives as better than others’ beliefs.  It is as if most people think they are
above average.
Odean (1996a), in analyzing individual customer accounts at a nationwide discount
brokerage house, examined the profits that customers made on trades that were apparently
not motivated by liquidity demands, tax loss selling, portfolio rebalancing, or a move to
lower-risk securities.  On the remaining trades, the returns on the stocks purchased was on
17See also Case and Shiller (1988) for a similar analysis of recent real estate booms and busts.
On the other hand, Garber (1990) analyzes some famous speculative bubbles, including the
tulipomania in the 17th century, and concludes that they may have been rational.
18Even public expectations of a stock market crash does not prevent the stock market from rising;
there is evidence from options prices that the stock market crash of 1987 was in some sense expected
before it happened; see Bates (1991, 1995).  Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) argue that investor
expectations, or rather “sentiment” can be measured by closed-end mutual fund discounts, which vary
through time.
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average lower, not higher, than on those sold.  This appears to be evidence of over-
confidence among these investors.
Within the week of the stock market crash of October 19, 1987 I sent out questionnaires
to 2,000 wealthy individual investors and 1,000 institutional investors, asking them to recall
their thoughts and reasons for action on that day; see Shiller (1987b).  There were 605
completed responses from individuals and 284 responses from institutions.  One of the
questions I asked was:  “Did you think at any point on October 19, 1987 that you had a
pretty good idea when a rebound was to occur?”  Of individual investors, 29.2% said yes,
of institutional investors, 28.0% said yes.  These numbers se m to be surprisingly high:  one
wonders why people thought they knew what was going to happen in such an unusual
situation.  Among those who bought on that day, the numbers were even higher, 47.1% and
47.9% respectively.  The next question on the questionnaire was “If yes, what made you
think you knew when a rebound was to occur?”  Here, there was a conspicuous absence of
sensible answers; often the answers referred to “intuition” or “gut feeling.”  It would appear
that the high volume of trade on the day of the stock market crash, as well as the occurrence,
duration, and reversal of the crash was in part determined by overconfidence in such
intuitive feelings.17
If people are not independent of each other in forming overconfident judgments about
investments, and if these judgments change collectively through time, then these “noisy”
judgments will tend to cause prices of speculative assets to deviate from their true
investment value.  Then a “contrarian” investment strategy, advocated by Graham and Dodd
(1934) and Dreman (1977) among many others, a strategy of investing in assets that are
currently out of favor by most investors, ought to be advantageous.  Indeed, there is much
evidence that such contrarian investment strategy does pay off, see for example, De Bondt
and Thaler (1985), Fama and French (1988, 1992), Fama (1991), and Lakonishok, Shleifer
and Vishny (1994).  That a simple contrarian strategy may be profitable may appear to some
to be surprising:  one might think that “smart money,” by competing with each other to
benefit from the profit opportunities, would ultimately have the effect of eliminating any
such profit opportunities.  But, there are reasons to doubt that such smart money will indeed




The disjunction effect is a tendency for people to want to wait to make decisions until
information is revealed, even if the information is not really important for the decision, and
even if they would make the same decision regardless of the information.  The disjunction
effect is a contradiction to the “sure-thing principle” of rational behavior (Savage, 1954).
Experiments showing the disjunction effect were performed by Tversky and Shafir
(1992).  They asked their subjects whether they would take one of the bets that Samuelson’s
lunch colleague, discussed above, had refused a coin toss in which one has equal chances
to win $200 or lose $100.  Those who took the one bet were then asked whether they then
wanted to take another such bet.  If they were asked after the outcome of the first bet was
known, then it was found that a majority of respondents took the second bet whether or not
they had won the first.  However, a majority would not take the bet if they had to make the
decision before the outcome of the bet was known.  This is a puzzling result:  if one’s
decision is the same regardless of the outcome of the first bet, then it would seem that one
would make the same decision before knowing the outcome.  Tversky and Shafir gave their
sense of the possible thought patterns that accompany such behavior:  if the outcome of the
first bet is known and is good, then subjects think that they have nothing to lose in taking
the second, and if the outcome is bad they want to try to recoup their losses.  But if the
outcome is not known, then they have no clear reason to accept the second bet.
The disjunction effect might help explain changes in the volatility of speculative asset
prices or changes in the volume of trade of speculative asset prices at times when
information is revealed.  Thus, for example, the disjunction effect can in principle explain
why there is sometimes low volatility and low volume of trade just before an important
announcement is made, and higher volatility or volume of trade after the announcement is
made.  Shafir and Tversky (1992) give the example of presidential elections, which
sometimes induce stock market volatility when the election outcome is known even though
many skeptics may doubt that the election outcome has any clear implications for market
value.
Gambling Behavior and Speculation
A tendency to gamble, to play games that bring on unnecessary risks, has been found to
pervade widely divergent human cultures around the world and appears to be indicative of
a basic human trait, Bolen and Boyd (1968).  Kallick et al. (1975) estimated that 61% of the
adult population in the United States participated in some form of gambling or betting in
1974.  They also estimated that 1.1% of men and 0.5% of women are “probably compulsive
gamblers,” while an additional 2.7% of men and 1% of women are “potential compulsive
gamblers.”  These figures are not trivial, and it is important to keep in mind that compulsive
gambling represents only an extreme form of the behavior that is more common.
The tendency for people to gamble has provided a puzzle for the theory of human
behavior under uncertainty, since it means that we must accommodate both risk-avoiding
behavior (as evidenced by people’s willingness to purchase insurance) with an apparent risk-
19According to the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM–IV (1994), “Most individuals with
Pathological Gambling say that they are seeking ‘action’ (an aroused, euphoric state) even more than
money.  Increasingly larger bets, or greater risks, may be needed to continue to produce the desired
level of excitement” (p. 616).
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loving behavior.  Friedman and Savage (1948) proposed that the co-existence of these
behaviors might be explained by utility functions that become concave upward in extremely
high range, but such an explanation has many problems.  For one thing, people who gamble
do not appear to be systematically risk seekers in any general sense, instead they are seeking
specific forms of entertainment or arousal.19  Moreover, the gambling urge is compart-
mentalized in people’s lives, it tends to take for each individual only certain forms:  people
specialize in certain games.  The favored forms of gambling tend to be associated with a sort
of ego involvement: people may feel that they are especially good at the games they favor
or that they are especially lucky with these.
The complexity of human behavior exemplified by the gambling phenomenon has to be
taken into account in understanding the etiology of bubbles in speculative markets.
Gamblers may have very rational expectations, at some level, for the likely outcome of their
gambling, and yet have other feelings that drive their actual behavior.  Economists tend to
speak of quantitative “expectations” as if these were the only characterization of people’s
outlooks that mattered.  It is my impression, from interviews and survey results, that the
same people who are highly emotionally involved with the notion that the stock market will
go up may give very sensible, unexciting, forecasts of the market if asked to make
quantitative forecasts.
The Irrelevance of History
One particular kind of overconfidence that appears to be common is a tendency to believe
that history is irrelevant, not a guide to the future, and that the future must be judged afresh
now using intuitive weighing only of the special factors we see now.  This kind of
overconfidence discourages taking lessons from past statistics; indeed most financial market
participants virtually never study historical data for correlations or other such statistics; they
take their anchors instead from casual recent observations.  Until academic researchers
started collecting financial data, most was just thrown away as irrelevant.
One reason that people may think that history is irrelevant is a human tendency toward
historical determinism, a tendency to think that historical events should have been known
in advance.  According to historian Florovsky (1969, p. 364):
In retrospect we seem to perceive the logic of events, which unfold
themselves in a regular order, according to a recognizable pattern, with an
alleged inner necessity, so that we get the impression that it really could not
have happened otherwise.
Fischhoff (1975) attempted to demonstrate this tendency towards historical determinism
20This feeling can of course be disrupted, if a sudden event calls to mind parallels to a past event,
or if the social cognition memorializes and interprets a past event as likely to be repeated.
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by presenting experimental subjects with incomplete historical stories, stories that are
missing the final outcome of the event.  The stories were from historical periods remote
enough in time that the subjects would almost certainly not know the actual outcome.
Subjects were asked to assign probabilities to each of four different possible conclusions to
the story (only one of which was the true outcome).  There were two groups of subjects, one
of which was told that one of the four outcomes had in fact happened.  The probability given
to the outcomes was on average 10% higher when people were told it was the actual
outcome.
Fischhoff’s demonstration of a behavior consistent with belief in historical determinism
may not demonstrate the full magnitude of such behavior, because it does not capture the
effects of social cognition of past events, a cognition that may tend to remember historical
facts that are viewed as causing subsequent historical events, or are connected to them, and
to forget historical facts that seem not to fit in with subsequent events.  It will generally be
impossible to demonstrate such phenomena of social cognition in short laboratory
experiments.
A human tendency to believe in historical determinism would tend to encourage people
to assume that past exigencies (the stock market crash of 1929, the great depression, the
world wars, and so on) were probably somewhat known in advance, or, at least, that before
these events people had substantial reason to worry that they might happen.  There may tend
to be a feeling that there is nothing definite on the horizon now, as there presumably was
before these past events.20  It is in this human tendency toward believing history is irrelevant
that the equity premium puzzle, discussed above, may have its most important explanation.
People may tend just not to think that the past stock market return history itself gives any
indication of the future, at least not until they perceive that authorities are in agreement that
it does.
According to the representativeness heuristic, discussed above, people may see past
return history as relevant to the future only if they see the present circumstances as
representative in some details of widely remembered past periods.  Thus, for example, the
public appears to have made much, just before the stock market crash of 1987, of similarities
in that period to the period just before the crash of 1929.  Newspapers, including the Wall
Street Journal on the morning of the stock market crash of October 19, 1987, showed plots
of stock prices before October 1929 superimposed on a plot of stock prices before October
1987, suggesting comparisons.  In this way, historical events can be remembered and viewed
as relevant, but this is not any systematic analysis of past data.
Lack of learning from historical lessons regarding financial and economic uncertainties
may explain why many investors show little real interest in diversification around the world
and why most investors appear totally uninterested in the correlation of their investments
with their labor income, violating with their behavior one of the most fundamental premises
of financial theory.  Most people do not make true diversification around the world a high
priority, and virtually no one is short the company that he or she works for, or is short the
21Kusko, Poterba and Wilcox (1997) showed, using data on 10,000 401k plan participants in a
manufacturing firm, found that barely 20% of participants directed any of their own balances into an
S&P index fund, while nearly 25% of participants directed all of their discretionary balances into a
fund invested completely in the own company stock.
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stock market in one’s own country, as would be suggested by economic theory.21
A prominent reason that most people appear apathetic about schemes to protect them
from price level uncertainty in nominal contracts is that they just do not seem to think that
past actual price level movements are any indicator of future uncertainty.  In a questionnaire
I distributed (1997a) to a random sample from phone books in the U.S.A. and Turkey, the
following question was posed:
We want to know how accurately you think that financial experts in
America (Turkey) can predict the price level in 2006, ten years from now.
Can you tell us, if these experts think that a “market basket” of goods and
services that the typical person buys will cost $1,000 (100 million TL) in
2006, then you think it will probably actually cost:
(Please fill in your lower and upper bounds on the price:)
Between $__________ (TL) and $__________ (TL)
The median ratio between high and low was 4/3 for U.S. respondents and 3/2 for
Turkish respondents.  Only a few respondents wrote numbers implying double- or triple-
digit ratios, even in Turkey.  The ratios not far from one that most respondents revealed
would seem to suggest excessive confidence in the predictability of price levels.  Note that
in Turkey the CPI increased three-fold between 1964 and 1974, 31-fold between 1974 and
1984, and 128-fold between 1984 and 1994.  But, Turkish respondents appear to connect the
price level movements with prior political and social events that may be perceived as having
largely predicted the price movements, events that are themselves not likely to be repeated
in the same way.  While these people have apparently learned to take certain steps to protect
themselves from price level uncertainty (such as not investing in long-term nominal bonds),
they do not appear to have a well-developed understanding of the potential uncertainty of
the Turkish Lira that would allow them to deal systematically with such uncertainty.  For
example, they have shown relatively little interest in government indexed bonds.
Magical Thinking
B. F. Skinner (1948) in what is now regarded as a classic experiment fed starved
experimental pigeons small quantities of food at regular fifteen-second intervals with no
dependence whatsoever on the bird’s behavior.  Even though the feeding was unaffected by
their behavior, the birds began to behave as if they had a “superstition” that something in
their behavior caused the feeding (see also McFadden, 1974).  Each pigeon apparently
conditioned itself to exhibit a specific behavior to get the food, and because each bird
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exhibited its characteristic behavior so reliably, it was never deconditioned:
One bird was conditioned to turn counter-clockwise in the cage, making
two or three turns between reinforcements.  Another repeatedly thrust its
head into one of the upper corners of the cage.  A third developed a  “
tossing”  response, as if placing its head beneath an invisible bar and lifting
it repeatedly.... (1948, p. 168)
Arbitrary behaviors that are so generated are referred to with the term “magical thinking”
by psychologists.
A wide variety of economic behaviors are likely to be generated in exactly the same way
that the arbitrary behaviors of the pigeons are generated.  Thus, for example, firms’
investment or management decisions that happened to precede increases in sales or profits
may tend to be repeated, and if this happens in a period of rising profits (as when the
economy is recovering from a recession) the notion that these decisions were the cause of
the sales or profit increase will be reinforced.  Because firms are similar to each other and
observe each other, the magical thinking may be social, rather than individual, and hence
may have aggregate effects.
Roll (1986), with his hubris hypothesis concerning corporate takeovers, argued that
managers of bidder firms may become overconfident of their own abilities to judge firms,
because of their luck in their first takeovers.  This overconfidence can cause them to overbid
in subsequent takeover attempts.
 The tendency for speculative markets to respond to certain news variables may be
generated analogously.  The U.S. stock market used often to be buoyed by positive news
about the economy, but in recent years it appears to tend to be moved in the opposite
direction by such news.  This new “perverse” movement pattern for the stock market is
sometimes justified in the media by a theory that the good news will cause the Federal
Reserve to tighten monetary policy and that then the higher interest rates will lower the
stock market.  But the whole belief could be the result of a chain of events that was set off
by some initial chance movements of the stock market.  Because people believe these
theories they may then behave so that the stock price does indeed behave as hypothesized,
the initial correlations will persist later, and thereby reinforce the belief.
Quasi-Magical Thinking
The term quasi-magical thinking, as defined by Shafir and Tversky (1992), is used to
describe situations in which people act as if they erroneously believe that their actions can
influence an outcome (as with magical thinking) but in which they in fact do not believe
this.  It includes acting as if one thinks that one can take actions that will, in effect, undo
what is obviously predetermined, or that one can change history.
For example, Quattrone and Tversky (1984) divided subjects into a control and
experimental group and then asked people in both groups to see how long they could bear
to hold their hands in some ice water.  In the experimental group subjects were told that
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people with strong hearts were better able to endure the ice water.  They found that those
in the experimental group in fact held their hands in the ice water longer.  If indeed, as
appears to be the case, those in the experimental group held their hands in the ice water
longer to prove that they had strong hearts, then this would be quasi-magical, since no
notion was involved that there was any causal link from holding hands in ice water to
strengthening the heart.
While this particular experimental outcome might also be explained as the result of a
desire for self deception, Shafir and Tversky report as well as other experiments that suggest
that people do behave as if they think they can change predetermined conditions.  Shafir and
Tversky (1992) show, with an experimental variant of Newcomb’s Paradox, that people
behave as if they can influence the amount of money already placed in a box.
Quasi-magical thinking appears to operate more strongly when outcomes of future
events, rather than historical events, are involved.  Langer (1975) showed that people place
larger bets if invited to bet before a coin is tossed than after (where the outcome has been
concealed), as if they think that they can better influence a coin not yet tossed.
It appears likely that such quasi-magical thinking explains certain economic phenomena
that would be difficult to explain the basis of strictly rational behavior.  Such thinking may
explain why people vote, and why shareholders exercise their proxies.  In most elections,
people must know that the probability that they will decide the election must be
astronomically small, and they would thus rationally decide not to vote.  Quasi-magical
thinking, thinking that in good societies people vote and so if I vote I can increase the
likelihood that we have a good society or a good company, might explain such voting.  The
ability of labor union members or oligopolists to act in concert with their counterparts,
despite an incentive to free-ride, or defect, may also be explained by quasi-magical thinking.
The disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985) referred to above, the tendency for
individuals to want to hold losers and sell winners might also be related to quasi-magical
thinking, if people feel at some level that holding on to losers can reverse the fact that they
have already lost.  Public demand for stocks at a time when they are apparently overvalued
may be influenced by quasi-magical thinking, a notion that if I hold, then the stocks will
continue to rise.
Attention Anomalies and the Availability Heuristic
William James (1890, p. 402) criticized earlier psychologists, who in their theories
effectively assumed that the human mind takes account of all sensory input, for taking no
note of the phenomenon of selective attention:
But the moment one thinks of the matter, one sees how false a notion of
experience that is which would make it tantamount to the mere presence to
the senses of an outward order.  Millions of items of the outward order are
present to my senses which never properly enter into my experience.  Why?
Because they have no interest for me.  My experience is what I agree to
22There is evidence that the stock market crash of 1987 can be viewed in these terms, see Shiller
(1989).
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attend to.  Only those items which I notice shape my mind — without
selective interest, experience is utter chaos.
The same criticism might equally well be applied to expected utility maximization models
in economics, for assuming that people attend to all facts that are necessary for
maximization of the assumed objective function (Berger, 1994, elaborates on this point).
Attention is associated with language; the structure of our language invites attention to
categories that are represented in the language.  Taylor (1989) showed, for example, that
certain concepts of “the self” were apparently absent from languages in the time of
Augustine.  The language shapes our attention to even the most inward of phenomena.
In economics, certain terms were apparently virtually absent from popular discourse
fifty or more years ago:  gross national product, the money supply, the consumer price
index.  Now, many economists are wont to model individual attention to these concepts as
if they were part of the external reality that is manifest to all normal minds.
Attention may be capricious because it is affected by the “salience” of the object;
whether it is easily discerned or not (Taylor and Thompson, 1982) or by the “vividness” of
the presentation, whether the presentation has colorful details.  Judgments may be affected,
according to the “availability heuristic,” that is, by the “ease with which instances or
associations come to mind”  (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
  Investment fashions and fads, and the resulting volatility of speculative asset prices,
appear to be related to the capriciousness of public attention (Shiller, 1984, 1987).  Investor
attention to categories of investments (stocks versus bonds or real estate, investing abroad
versus investing at home) seems to be affected by alternating waves of public attention or
inattention.  Investor attention to the market at all seems to vary through time, and major
crashes in financial markets appear to be phenomena of attention, in which an inordinate
amount of public attention is suddenly focussed on the markets.22
Economic theories that are most successful are those that take proper account of the
limitations and capriciousness of attention.  One reason that the hypothesis of no
unexploited arbitrage opportunities (a hypothesis that has led to the Black–Scholes (1973)
option pricing theory, the Ross (1976) arbitrage pricing theory, and other constructs of
finance) has been so successful is that it does not rely on pervasive public attention.  The
essence of the no-arbitrage assumption, when it is used successfully to produce theories in
finance, is that the arbitrage opportunities, were they to ever exist, would be exploited and
eliminated even if only a tiny fraction of investors were paying attention to the opportunity.
Culture and Social Contagion
The concept of culture, central to sociology and cultural anthropology ever since the work
of Tylor (1871), Durkheim (1893) and Weber (1947), is related to the selective attention that
the human mind exhibits.  There is a social cognition, reenforced by conversation, ritual and
23The psychologist Janis (1972) has documented with case studies how social patterns
(“groupthink”) within decision making groups can cause even highly intelligent people to make
disastrously wrong decisions.
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symbols, that is unique to each interconnected group of people; to each nation, tribe, or
social group.  People tend not to remember well facts or ideas that are not given attention
in the social cognition, even though a few people may be aware of such facts.  If one speaks
to groups of people about ideas that are foreign to their culture, one may find that someone
in the group will know of the ideas, and yet the ideas have no currency in the group and
hence have no influence on their behavior at large.
The array of facts, suppositions, symbols, categories of thought that represent a culture
have subtle and far-reaching affects on human behavior.  For a classic example, Durkheim
(1897), in a careful study of differing suicide rates across countries, found that there was no
apparent explanation for these differing rates other than cultural differences.
Cultural anthropologists have used methods of inferring elements of primitive culture
by immersing themselves in the society, observing their everyday life, and talking and
listening to them nonjudgmentally, letting them direct the conversation.  From such learning,
for example, Lévy–Strauss (1966, pp. 9–10) wrote persuasively that the customs of primitive
people that we may tend to view as inexplicably savage actually arise as a logical
consequence of a belief system common to all who belong to the society, a belief system
which we can grow to understand only with great difficulty:
The real question is not whether the touch of a woodpecker’s beak does in
fact cure toothache.  It is rather whether there is a point of view from which
a woodpecker’s beak and a man’s tooth can be seen as ‘going together’ (the
use of this congruity for therapeutic purposes being only one of its possible
uses) and whether some initial order can be introduced into the universe by
means of these groupings....  The thought we call primitive is founded on
this demand for order.
The same methods that cultural anthropologists use to study primitive peoples can also be
used to study modern cultures.  O’Barr and Conley (1992) studied pension fund managers
using personal interviews and cultural anthropological methods.  They concluded that each
pension fund has its own culture, associated often with a colorful story of the origin of their
own organization, akin to the creation myths of primitive peoples.  The culture of the
pension fund is a belief system about investing strategy and that culture actually drives
investment decisions.  Cultural factors were found to have great influence because of a
widespread desire to displace responsibility for decisions onto the organization, and because
of a desire to maintain personal relationships within the organization.23
Psychological research that delineates the factors that go into the formation of culture
has been undertaken under the rubric of social psychology and attitude change, or under
social cognition.  There is indeed an enormous volume of research in these areas.  For
surveys, one may refer to McGuire (1985) for attitude change or Levine and Resnick (1993)
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for social cognition.
One difficulty that these researchers have encountered with experimental work is that
of disentangling the “rational” reasons for the imitation of others with the purely
psychological.  Some recent economic literature has indeed shown the subtlety of the
informational influences on people’s behavior (learning from each other), see Bannerjee
(1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Leahy (1994), and Shiller (1995).
A Global Culture
We see many examples of imitation across countries apparently widely separated by both
physical and language barriers.  Fashions of dress, music, and youthful rebellion, are
obvious examples.  The convergence of seemingly arbitrary fashions across nations is
evidence that something more is at work in producing internationally-similar human
behavior than just rational reactions to common information sets relevant to economic
fundamentals, see Featherstone (1990).
And yet it will not be an easy matter for us to decide in what avenues global culture
exerts its influence (Hannerz, 1990, p. 237):
There is now a world culture, but we had better make sure that we
understand what this means.  It is marked by an organization of diversity
rather than by a replication of uniformity.  No total homogenization of
systems of meaning and expression has occurred, nor does it appear likely
that there will be one any time soon.  But the world has become one
network of social relationships, and between its different regions there is
a flow of meanings as well as of people and goods.
Sociologists have made it their business to study patterns of influence within cultures,
and we ought to be able to learn something about the nature of global culture from their
endeavors.  For example, one study of patterns of influence regarded as a classic among
sociologists is the in-depth study of the town of Rovere by sociologist Robert Merton
(1957).  After extensive study of the nature of interpersonal influence, he sought meaningful
ways to categorize people.  He found that it was meaningful to divide people into two broad
categories:  locals (who follow local news and derive status by their connectedness with
others) and cosmopolitans (who orient themselves instead to world news and derive status
from without the community).  He found that the influence of cosmopolitans on locals
transcended both their numbers and their stock of useful information.  We must bear this
conclusion in mind when deciding how likely it is that incipient cultural trends are pervasive
across many different nations.
Reading such sociological studies inclines us to rather different interpretations of
globally similar behaviors than might occur naturally to many traditional economists.  Why
did the real estate markets in many cities around the world rise together into the late 1980s
and fall in the early 1990s?  (See Goetzmann and Wachter, 1996 and Hendershott, 1997.)
Why have the stock markets of the world moved somewhat together? Why did the stock
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markets of the world show greater tendency to move together after the stock market crash
of 1987?  (See von Furstenberg and Jeon, 1989 and King, Sentana and Wadhwani, 1994.)
If we recognize the global nature of culture, there is no reason to assume that these events
have anything to do with genuine information about economic fundamentals.
Concluding Remarks
Since this paper was written in response to an invitation to summarize literature on
behavioral theory in finance, it has focussed exclusively on this topic, neglecting the bulk
of finance literature.  Because of its focus on anomalies and departures from conventional
notions of rationality, I worry that the reader of this paper can get a mistaken impression
about the place of behavioral theory in finance, and of the importance of conventional
theory.
The lesson from the literature surveyed here, and the list of varied behavioral
phenomena, is not that “anything can happen” in financial markets.  Indeed, while the
behavioral theories have much latitude for interpretation, when they are combined with
observations about behavior in financial markets, they allow us to develop theories that do
have some restrictive implications.  Moreover, conventional efficient markets theory is not
completely out the window.  I could have, had that been the goal of this paper, found very
many papers that suggest that markets are impressively efficient in certain respects.
Financial anomalies that intuitive assessments of human nature might lead one to expect
to find, or anomalies one hears casually about, often turn out to be tiny, ephemeral, or
nonexistent.  There is, for example, virtually no Friday the thirteenth effect (Chamberlain
et al., 1991; Dyl and Maberly, 1988).  Investors apparently aren’t that foolish.
Heeding the lessons of the behavioral research surveyed here is not going to be simple
and easy for financial researchers.  Doing research that is sensitive to lessons from
behavioral research does not mean entirely abandoning research in the conventional
expected utility framework.  The expected utility framework can be a workhorse for some
sensible research, if it is used appropriately.  It can also be a starting point, a point of
comparison from which to frame other theories.
It is critically important for research to maintain an appropriate perspective about human
behavior and an awareness of its complexity.  When one does produce a model, in whatever
tradition, one should do so with a sense of the limits of the model, the reasonableness of its
approximations, and the sensibility of its proposed applications.
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